Two expeditions, the same South Pole
In December 1911, two groups raced to be the first to set foot on the South Pole: one led by the Norwegian Roald Amundsen, the other by the Englishman Robert Falcon Scott. Both faced the same ice and the same cutting wind of the Antarctic winter. Amundsen arrived first and came back with his whole team alive. Scott arrived a month later and died with his companions on the way back, just a few miles from a food depot that could have saved the expedition.
Collins and Hansen open the book with this comparison because it sums up the central question of the research: facing the same hostile environment, why does one team survive and another fall apart? Amundsen had planned every detail years in advance: he used trained dogs to pull sleds over the ice, marked the supply depots with flags on both sides of the route, creating redundancy in case one marker got lost in a blizzard, and kept an almost identical daily pace, rain or shine, or rather, calm or storm.
Scott, by contrast, mixed methods without firm criteria: ponies, a motorized sled that broke down in the extreme cold, and men hauling cargo by hand when everything else failed. On a good day, he pushed the team beyond what was reasonable; on a bad day, he sometimes stayed in the tent. This inconsistency, more than bad luck with the weather, is what the authors point to as the difference between those who came back alive and those who did not.
